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For both foreigners and citizens of the People’s Republic of China core functions of the
state in many places are unclear or misunderstood. The administration of China is
based on a cadre elite (rè) that serves as reservoir for leading functions in government
and the Communist Party of China. The assignment of these positions partly follows
a politically well controlled assessment of performance. One aspect of this so called
Cadre Evaluation System is a review of economic performance of leaders. In this paper
we research the validity of this pillar of political empowerment. The theory says that
these days political loyalty can be found in following the policy of creating wealth and
contributing to a better economic wellbeing of the people. If we suppose that there is
a causative correlation between this economic performance of leaders and their political
appreciation, a promotion would show that the center can rule even the careers of our
sample of ú county leaders in alignment with central policy. In such a case good
economic figures of the county would contibute (inter alia) to an improvement of career,
that is a higher probability of being promoted to a party secretary of this administrative
level. Our examination extends over the years 1999-2008 and gives hints that research
on a larger scale including as many economic indicators as can be retrieved is necessary.
It can help both—a better understanding of the state China and an improvement of
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What is the real character of China’s society these days?1
Detailed Information on structural dynamics and function of China’s government and
its relation to economic affairs is scarce—in China as well as abroad. Trying to treat the
abovestanding question brings researchers in severe conflict. Outside of China data on
political and economic decisions undergoes a doubled filter: When this information is
about to cross borders, it will be deliberately held low from Chinese side and afterwards
will be arbitrarily biased by foreign communication channels. Inside of China two kinds
of problems will come up as a stumbling block for researchers: First, a close look on
the intertwined actions of politics and economy might be seen as endangerment for the
central party’s legitimacy what could have a detrimental effect on the authors carreer
and second, relying and focusing only on Chinese sources implies the risk of ending
in the “sinological trap” (Heilmann 2004, p. 22). When not taking foreign comparable
situations into account, such as applying methods of comparative political sciences or
other systematic sciences, a reduced validity of the analysis can be the consequence.
In this thesis we try to combine the opportunity of directly accessing Chinese sources,
that means, qualitative information in personal contacts as well as official data, with















1 Introduction 1.1 Motivation
a non-Chinese viewpoint granting a certain distance to the matter under scrutiny. We
hope to find one more aspect of treating the question of the first line: To know a part of
the underlying mechanisms that move a Chinese politician in his daily decisions could
be a contribution to this complex picture.
1.1 Motivation
On 18th December 1978 in the third plenum of the eleventh Central Committe China’s
officials decided about a step that formed a new state. The underlying policy of the
starting 9i > (reform and opening-up) was to not anymore literally stick to the
words of Ûý (Máo Zédōng).2 Instead of an untimely and more often than not
detrimental interpretation of his words, s (Dèng Xiǎopíng) gave out the parole
B/ (seek truth from facts).3 Those facts should be less linked to ideological
and political construction, but rather should describe the country’s and population’s
whereabouts and propose ways of improving everybody’s situation. This connection to
reality enables a new method of measuring and controlling, that before this time was
not that reproducible. Three points propose a specific approach for measuring political
success:
1. With party and country facing reality –  – the Central Committee put heavy-
weight not any longer on class struggle but rather on economic construction, what
seemed to be apt in an impovered state.
2This strict adhesion to Ûý words was known as $*á/ (the two whatever’s). Those two
things are: Support whatever policy decisions Û;- (Chairman Máo) made and follow whatever
instructions Û;- gave.
3This saying originates in the works of 4 (Dài Zhèn), a scholar of the 18th century, who pro-















1 Introduction 1.1 Motivation
2. In the next chapter we will show how political loyalty to leaders is expected to
become manifested and perceptible: Especially after 1978 it shows up in economic
hard facts.
3. A clear and open system of assessing rè (cadre) performance was introduced.
ThisM#û6 (Cadre Evaluation System) emphasizes achievements in economic
indicators such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or tax income.
With those hints suggesting a look at economic hard facts this paper will deal with
several questions in a field of big uncertainty: The Chinese Official’s decision making.
China’s leaders, especially since the onset of 9i >, act in a morally thin air of find-
ing their path between the poles of central government’s policies for national wellbeing
and informal politics including personal benefit. This contradiction is even more delicate
when taking a discrete democratic influence into the picture, as it appears more often
than expected from a perspective outside of China. When the national aim is ÏNú
¾ (economic construction), political loyalty means compliance with this objective. In
other words, an official is a good politician, if the economy of his area of responsibility
is prospering. The opposite would be caused by decisions not aligned with this aim of
wellgoing economics. Before this changed political rationale, an assessment of perfor-
mance was not that reproducible and basing on personal evaluation of how an official
fulfilled his political duties. With public access to economic performance indicators4
and this principle being valid, it is possible to examine if it is this enforced guideline on
political success or other more informal processes that mark the questioned official as a
good politician.
4Even when we expect a numerical overestimation of performance indicators, those incorrect publica-
tions do not make a difference at all. It is the same data we hold in public hands, that is available














1 Introduction 1.2 Review
As we cannot collect decorations, medals or badges, that are assigned to an official’s
work when he performs well in his political duties, we chose to examine the carreer
paths of governmental executives. As s stated (Xiaoping 1984), rèý
ý
(cadres can climb up, but not go down), a close look at promotions of a representative
group of officials in comparable conditions could allow conclusions on the evaluation and
importance of their work. This group was chosen to be the¿ (chief governmental
executives of county level jurisdictions) in ú (Fújiàn province). A promotion tof
° (party secretary) following a good work in their job can be expected. Other outcomes
are a removal out of our list of personnel or remaining in the same job in the following
year. Our data on economic performance and personnel situation covers the time 1999–
2008 and expands over 67 ¿ or .
We expect to find a correlation between cadre turnover and economic performance of
their regions. Guo 2007 remarks that a correlation is a good sign of a functional control
of higher governmental levels over the examined personnel. Tanner and Green 2008
on the other hand regard this kind of connection between quantifiable, concrete and
accessible data and political consequences as too evident to be expanded to other areas
of work and politics. It might make an assessment of central power too strong and
distort the picture of the general central–local relation. In the following chapter we will
review literature that might help fathoming out our findings on the relation between
China’s economy and politics.
1.2 Review
Literature on political structures in China remains rather superficial especially having
the overwhelmingly large dimensions of the Chinese state apparatus in mind. Miller
2004 remarks that in an August 11th account it was announced publicly by the official














1 Introduction 1.2 Review
á& (Hú J̌ıntāo) would deliver a report on the Politburo’s work since the November
2002 16th Party Congress. However, no Mainland newspaper or communication channel
dares publishing the detailed content worked on, as it must have leaked from other
sources due to the restrictions on the abovestanding report. (Shirk 2008) However, it
was a great step forward that news could communicate a meeting was held and what at
least the topic was. One good point of holding information on domestic politics low is
maintaining a facade of unanimity what strengthens the party’s legitimacy. In the first
section we will have a short glance at institutions’ structure—as far as our work draws
upon them.
Another aspect of examining the Chinese governmental organization is beholding pro-
cesses to an extent an external observer can get into it. Systemic relations between state
institutions remain undisclosed when regarding official communications. Mostly for legit-
imation reasons the interrelated situation between the-ýq§Z (Chinese Communist
Party, CCP), the central and the local government and a rather new economic arena
remain hard to probe for both Chinese citizens and foreigners. Rather discrete aspects
of the economical/political situation enjoy a good amount of treatises, for instance the
popular topic of sû (personal connections), that touches a good majority of relations
and therefore is rather easy to research. When going deeper though, a qualitative anal-
ysis will end up in scarce anecdotal evidence that cannot represent the whole picture in
a satisfying way. The author of these lines encountered the same problem when he first
attempted deploying qualitative research methods: On university campus5 interviews
were comparatively easy to perform for first informations. The step outside to the local
government in order to interview rè or l¡X (officials or civil servants, german:
“Beamte”) though was not easy to perform and in respect to the size of this work aban-
doned in favour of a quantitative research method. The second section will review those
5In Chinese universities already a reduced replication of the state structure can be found as the basic














1 Introduction 1.2 Review
processes in Chinese governmental offices. A division into three subsections examines
literature on decision making, the relation between economics and politics and finally
will try to scrutinize factors determining a carreer in Chinese politics.
1.2.1 Political and Economical Structures: Frameworks for
Decisions
Both, statutes of the CCP and the constitution make clear that China is a highly cen-
tralized state governed in unity. A strong center in ¬ is safeguarding this situation
and subordinate institutions of party and government are obliged to adhere to orders
coming from above. In order to enforce their commands, pronounce their authority and
to correct deviating leaders a variety of instruments are availed by the center. Accord-
ing to formal principles of order the PCR should be a hierarchically organized command
system, where the central political leaders can unrestrictedly “tune” lower levels of orga-
nization. However and in reality, the reality looks different: Besides those rigid structure
the relation between local and central leaders has developped its own dynamics beyond
the normatives of party statute and constitution. (Heilmann 2004)
Top cadres at the province-level (what includes the five autonomous regions and four
cities directly under central command) have respectable power in the governance of the
PCR. Especially leaders of economically prosperous and populous provinces play an im-
portant role as partner of the center in conferencing and negotiating. Usually they also
hold a position in the -ýq§Z-.ÔX (Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China), sometimes even in the -ýq§Z-.?»@ (Central Politburo of
the Communist Party of China), and show a direct influence on decision-making of the
center. As these days the eastern provinces, such as ú, are the wealthiest regions,
together with ¬ top cadres they are overrepresented in the Politburo, Central Com-














1 Introduction 1.2 Review
Congress) (Heilmann 2004). Figure 1.1 shows the administrative levels in the Chinese
State. As Saich 2004 (p. 121) though says, in the Chinese case, “formal organization
charts often hide as much as they reveal about where real power lies in the system”.
Figure 1.1: Levels of Government Under the State Council, 2003. In addition there
are the two Special Administrative Region (SARs) of / (Hong Kong) and ³è
(Macao) that will retain their existing political and economic systems for up to 50
years. From: Saich 2004.
In the Chinese central government an institution responsible for representing regional
interest is not installed. Such an institution for instance is another house in parliament in
other countries. Those rigid structures focusing on the center however are complemented














1 Introduction 1.2 Review
Zhao and Hamrin 1995; Barnett 1967; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Saich 2004)
The hierarchical structure of the state consists of five levels plus two additional special
levels for municipalities under central government and Special Administrative Regions
(Hong Kong, Macao). When beholding those levels, an inadequate interpretation of
responsibility by the researcher could happen: The strong entanglement and informal
procedures dissolve thos rigid patterns by overlaying a highly dynamic negotiational
practice. Predominantly it is inner and outer security that fully is under central control.
During the 1980s in a rather fast way Special Economic Zones, but also softer constraints
on local regions for strengthening the economy were set up. This relation evolved to
a comparatively imbalanced enforcement of local interests, that gave little space for
national interests. In certain interests those regional and national concerns covered the
same area, but in more they fell apart: A good control over inflation, development
of poorer provinces, consequent enforcement of economic legislation and an assured
cash-flow to the centre were out of focus when leading a smaller region. Furthermore
this distance that partly came from an increased economic accountability, partly from
a more liberal political guideline resulted in a new interpretation of the saying 
	
?V	ùV (up there they have their political measueres, down here we have our
countermeasures). This relation also formed the peculiarity of regional leaders acting
like feudalistic patrons protecting the economy under their jurisdiction by establishing
trade barriers against goods from outside their area. This is one factor contributing
to Lieberthal 1995’s theory of “fragmented authority” we have a look at in chapter
1.2.2. Authority in China is fragmented both vertically and horizontally, what leads to
a “negotiated state”, as Saich 2004 (p. 121) calls it. It describes how “the nature” (ib.)
of individual institutions differs depending on the relationship they have negotiated with
the rest of the political machinery.
Another structure, which power cannot be found in organizational charts, are central
üÄ (Leading Groups). These small groups are led by a member of the Politburo














1 Introduction 1.2 Review
members are experts in specialized functional sectors or ûß (systems). By gathering
knowledge and responsibility they can swiftly penetrate and examine upcoming issues
and forge policy guidelines and goals (Lieberthal 1995, p. 96). Starting in 1958, Leading
Groups were duplicated on lower party levels, what led to a dual subordination: Every
organization reported to the Leading Group of its own level, as well to those above
investaging downwards. Susan Shirk (in Lieberthal 1995, p. 64) remarks that the
Party Leading Group within a government agency is much more powerful that the Party
committee. The Party committee only supervises the ideological direction of the Party
memebers within that agency, whereas the Pary Leading Group has authority over both,
Party and non-Party bureaucrats.
In the 1980s more information became available on the horizontal coordination, that
was supposed to correct the traditional vertical organizational heavyweight producing
uncoordinated and often conflicting demands an policies. ;cP (Comprehensive co-
ordination points) and c (subordinated coordination points) were installed in order to
integrate functional systems and their subordinated entities, that worked better when
related to each other. These points acted both ways: They gathered informations used
for creating general policies and in the other direction coordinated the implementation of
decided policies. These gateways connected the cadre to a functional area of government
and party. If officials had those points under there control, power in more directions
was the consequence. For instance, in the late 1980s, when u+3 (Zhào Žıyáng) was
promoted to the CCP generaly secretary he fought against Nl (Ľı Péng) for control
over the economics coordination point. Doing, so, NO could keep him away from sev-
eral key policy issues. Saich 2004 (p. 122) furthermore remarks that by the end of the
1980’s the importance of those gateways (except those on party affairs and propaganda)
had declined.
One more point, Saich 2004 et al. beholds as crucial point in the structure of the Chinese
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